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Dr  Marianne  Ojo,  School  of  Social  Sciences  and  Law  Oxford  Brookes  University,  Oxford.  (Email: 
marianneojo@hotmail.com or marianneojo@brookes.ac.uk). The second part of this article will appear in the October 
issue of the Banking and Financial Services Policy Report.
Response to Consultative Document on Strengthening the Resilience of the 
Banking Sector: Proposals to Strengthen Global Capital and Liquidity 
Regulations
A. Introduction
The 1988 Basel Accord was adopted as a means of achieving two primary objectives namely:1
 - „To help strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system. This would 
be facilitated where international banking organisations were encouraged to supplement their 
capital positions.
 - To mitigate competitive inequalities“
The  framework  was  not  only  oriented  towards  increasing  the  sensitivity  of  regulatory  capital 
differences  in  risk  profiles  which  exist  within  banking  organisations,  but  was  also  aimed  at 
discouraging the retention of liquid,  low risk assets.2 Furthermore,  it  was designed to take into 
express  consideration,  off  balance  sheet  exposures  when  assessments  of  capital  adequacy  are 
undertaken.3
Ten years following the conclusion of the agreement on the 1988 Accord, a Working Party was 
established to evaluate  the impact  and achievements of the Basel Accord.  Two principal  issues 
which were taken into consideration by the Working Party were:4 Firstly, whether some banks have 
been encouraged to hold higher capital ratios than would have been the case if the adoption of fixed 
minimum capital requirements had not occurred and, whether an increase in capital or reduction of 
lending has resulted in any increase in ratios. Secondly, an evaluation of the impact of fixed capital 
requirements on reduced risk taking by banks, in relation to capital, was also to be undertaken.
In  response  to  the  first  issue,  relating  to  whether  an  introduction  of  fixed  minimum  capital 
requirements  has  led  to  banks  maintaining  higher  capital  ratios,  some  studies  which  were 
undertaken, revealed that capital standards, when strictly adhered to, compelled weakly capitalised 
banks to consolidate their capital ratios.5 In response to whether banks adjusted their capital ratios 
to comply with requirements through an increase in capital or a reduction of risk-weighted assets, 
research revealed that banks responded to pressures stemming from capital ratios, in a way which 
they perceived to  be most  cost  effective.6 Results  obtained in  response to  an evaluation of  the 
impact of capital requirements on risk taking were inconclusive.7 The data available for purposes of 
measuring bank risk taking, were not only limited, but also complicated the task of making an 
evaluation thereof.8
Other issues which were difficult to evaluate included whether an introduction of minimum capital 
requirements for banks were detrimental to their competitiveness and whether the Basel Accord 
facilitated competitive inequalities amongst banks.9 These evaluative difficulties, respectively, were 
attributed firstly, to the fact that “long term competitiveness of banking” depends on a variety of 
factors – most of which are not connected to regulation and secondly, to the available evidence at 
the time – which was inconclusive – and hence, not sufficiently persuasive.10
I. Amendments to the 1988 Accord
The First Consultative Paper – The Three Pillar Model
In June 1999, as a means of replacing the 1988 Basel Accord, the first consultative paper (on a new 
capital adequacy framework) was issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The First 
Consultative Paper introduced the “three pillar” model which comprises of “the minimum capital 
requirements” – that attempt to consolidate the rules established in the 1988 Accord, “supervisory 
review” and “market discipline” – “as a lever to strengthen disclosure and encourage safe and sound 
banking practices”.11 Whilst  acknowledging that the 1988 Accord had “helped to strengthen the 
soundness  and stability of  the  international  banking  system and enhanced competitive  equality 
among internationally active banks”, it was added that the new framework provided by the first 
consultative paper was “designed to better align regulatory capital requirements to underlying risks 
and to recognise the improvements to risk measurement12 and control.“
One of the flaws inherent in the 1988 Basel Accord was namely, the fact that it rewarded risky 
lending since it  required banks to set  aside the same amount  of capital  against  loans  to shaky 
borrowers as against those with better credits.13 Apart from the fact that capital requirements were 
just  reasonably  related  to  bank’s  risk  taking,  the  credit  exposure  requirement  was  the  same 
regardless of the credit  rating of the borrower.14 Furthermore,  the capital  requirement for credit 
exposure often depended on the exposure’s legal form – for instance, an on-balance sheet loan was 
generally subject to a higher capital requirement than an off-balance sheet to the same borrower.15 
In addition to  such insensitivity to  risk,  another  problem which resulted from Basel  2 was  the 
unwillingness of banks to invest in better risk management systems.
II. Capital Arbitrage
A general criticism of Basel I relates to the fact that it promoted capital arbitrage. This is attributed 
to  its  wide  risk  categories  which  provide  banks  with  the  liberty  to  “arbitrage  between  their 
economic  assessment  of  risk  and  the  regulatory  capital  requirements.”16 “Regulatory  capital 
arbitrage” involves the practice by banks of “using securitisation to alter the profile of their book 
and may produce the effect of making the bank’s capital ratios appear inflated.17  Such a practice 
justifies the extension of regulation to the securities markets – rather than being merely confined to 
the field of banking.
Four  principal  types  of  identified  capital  arbitrage  include:18cherry  picking,  securitisation  with 
partial recourse, remote origination and indirect credit. 
III. Basel II 
Some of the key factors which instigated the introduction of Basel 2 include:19 
− „Changes in the structure of capital markets – resulting in the need for the incorporation of 
increased competitiveness of credit markets in capital requirements
− The need for measures which would facilitate the eradication of inefficiencies in lending 
markets 
− Explosive debt levels which were generated during the economic upturn.“
Under Basel II, and in response to the fact that the measurement of minimum capital was previously 
based on a general assessment of risk dispersion which did not correspond to specific circumstances 
of individual institutions, credit institutions will be required to retain more capital if required. Under 
Pillar 1, the definition of capital and minimum capital coefficient remain unchanged – however, 
credit  institutions  will  be  required  to  retain  more  capital  if  their  individual  risk  situation  so 
demands.20 Further advancements under Basel II are illustrated in the areas of risk measurements. 
The measurement methods for credit risk are more sophisticated than was previously the case. For 
the first time, a means of measuring operational risk has been set out.21 Under Pillar One, credit and 
market risk are supplemented by operational risk – which is to be corroborated by capital.22 
B. Basel  Committee's  Proposals  to  Strengthen  Global  Capital  and  Liquidity  
Regulations
I. Objectives of the Basel Committee's Proposals to Strengthen Global Capital and Liquidity 
Regulations23
- “As well as strengthening global capital and liquidity regulations (which would ultimately 
facilitate a more resilient banking sector), the Basel Committee’s reforms are aimed towards 
improving the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic 
stress – hence mitigating spill over risks from the financial sector to the real economy.
- The  Committee  is  also  striving  towards  the  improvement  of  risk  management  and 
governance as well as strengthen banks’ transparency and disclosures. “
II. Key elements of the Basel Committee’s proposals
1) The quality, consistency, and transparency of capital base will be raised to ensure that large, 
internationally active banks are in a better position to absorb losses on both a going concern 
and gone concern basis. (For example, under the current Basel Committee standard, banks 
could hold as little as 2% common equity to risk-based assets, before the application of key 
regulatory adjustments).
 -  As well  as recommending an increase in the quality,  consistency and transparency of capital 
base24, the Basel Committee’s recognition of the fact that “insufficient detail on the components of 
capital”25 render “accurate assessment of its  quality or a meaning comparison with other banks 
difficult”,  infers  its  acknowledgement  of  the  importance  attributed  to  enhanced  disclosures. 
Furthermore,  the  increased importance  attached to  the  role  of  central  counter  parties  in  efforts 
aimed at reducing systemic risks should also facilitate the process of achieving greater and more 
enhanced disclosures.
2) The risk coverage of the capital framework will be strengthened. In addition to the trading 
book  and  securitisation  reforms  announced  in  July  2009,  the  Committee  proposes  the 
consolidation of the capital requirements for counterparty credit risk exposures arising from 
derivatives  and  securities  financing  activities.  These  enhancements  are  aimed  at 
strengthening  the  resilience  of  individual  banking  institutions  and  reducing  the  risk  of 
shocks  being  transmitted  from  one  institution  to  another  through  the  derivatives  and 
financing  channel.  Consolidated  counterparty  capital  requirements  should  increase 
incentives to transfer OTC derivative exposures to central counterparties and exchanges. 
However there is also a limit to what the capital framework could address. As highlighted by the 
recent  crisis,  capital  requirements  on  their  own,  were  insufficient  in  addressing  liquidity  and 
funding problems which arose during the crisis. The importance of enhanced disclosures is also 
reflected  and embodied  within  the  Committee's  second objective  in  relation  to  its  proposal  to 
strengthen the resilience of the banking sector, that is, its endeavours “to improve risk management 
and governance as well as strengthen banks’ transparency and disclosures.”
As a result of the inability of bank capital adequacy requirements, on their own, to address funding 
and liquidity problems26, the need to focus on Pillar 3 of Basel II, namely, market  discipline, is 
becoming more apparent. There is growing justification for greater measures aimed at extending 
capital  rules to  the securities markets.  This not  only arises from increased conglomeration and 
globalisation – which increases risks attributed to systemic contagion, but also the fact that „the 
globalisation of financial markets has made it possible for investors and capital seeking companies 
to switch to lightly regulated or completely unregulated markets.“27 Furthermore, it  is not only 
argued that „the fact that many banks in a number of countries have chosen to securitise assets is 
probably largely due to the capital requirements imposed on them“, but also that present rules do 
not „explicitly cover risks other than credit and market risk“.28
The engagement of market participants in the corporate reporting process, a process which would 
consequently  enhance  market  discipline,  constitutes  a  fundamental  means  whereby  greater 
measures aimed at facilitating prudential supervision, could be extended to the securities markets. 
Through  Pillar  3,  market  participants  like  credit  agencies  can  determine  the  levels  of  capital 
retained by banks – hence their potential to rectify or exacerbate pro cyclical effects resulting from 
Pillars 1 and 2. The challenges encountered by Pillars 1 and 2 in addressing credit risk is reflected 
by problems  identified  with  pro  cyclicality,  which  are  attributed  to  banks’ extremely sensitive 
internal credit risk models, and the level of capital buffers which should be retained under Pillar 
Two. Such issues justify the need to give greater prominence to Pillar 3.
As a result of the influence and potential of market participants in determining capital levels, such 
market  participants  are  able  to  assist  regulators  in  managing  more  effectively,  the  impact  of 
systemic risks which occur when lending criteria is tightened owing to Basel II's procyclical effects. 
Regulators are able to respond and to manage with greater efficiency, systemic risks to the financial 
system during periods when firms which are highly leveraged become reluctant to lend. This being 
particularly the case when such firms decide to cut back on lending activities, and the decisions of 
such firms cannot  be justified in  situations  where such firms’ credit  risk models are  extremely 
sensitive  –  hence  the  level  of  capital  being  retained  is  actually  much  higher  than  minimum 
regulatory Basel capital requirements.29
The European Central Bank’s report on “Credit Default Swaps and Counter Party Risk” identifies 
asymmetrical information as constituting a challenge for non-dealer market participants since in its 
view, price information is currently limited, as dealer prices are typically set on a bilateral basis and 
are not available to non-dealers.30 Furthermore, the Report also identifies the role played by credit 
default swaps in the recent financial crises, highlights the contribution of counter risk management 
in  the  collapse  of  Bear  Stearns  and  Lehman  Brothers,  and  also  the  challenges  relating  to  the 
management of counter party risk exposures which arise from Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) and 
other (“over the counter”) OTC derivatives.31
Furthermore, the ECB recently highlighted that “no disclosure requirements currently exist within 
the IASB accounting standards with respect to the main counterparts for derivative transactions.” It 
also states that “added disclosures for large counter parties and those that exceed certain thresholds 
would be useful in order to enable market participants to better assess their counterparty32 risk and 
the potential for systemic spill over effects.”
3) The Basel Committee will  introduce a leverage ratio as a supplementary measure to the 
Basel II risk based framework with a view to changing to a Pillar 1 treatment based on 
appropriate review and calibration. This should help to contain the build up of excessive 
leverage in the banking system, introduce additional safeguards against attempts to “game” 
the risk based requirements, and help address model risk. In order to ensure comparability, 
the  details  of  the  leverage  ratio  are  to  be  harmonised  internationally.  –  making  full 
adjustments for residual accounting differences. 
4) The Committee will  introduce a  series of measures aimed at  promoting the build  up of 
capital buffers during good times – which could be drawn upon during periods of stress. A 
counter cyclical capital framework will contribute to a more stable banking system which 
will  help  dampen,  instead  of  amplify,  economic  and  financial  shocks.  In  addition  the 
Committee  will  be  promoting  a  more  forward  looking  provisioning  which  is  based  on 
expected losses, and which captures actual losses with greater transparency and which is 
also less pro cyclical than the present model (the “incurred loss” provisioning model).
As was highlighted under  the introductory section,  the promotion of financial  stability through 
more risk sensitive capital requirements, constitutes one of Basel II’s primary objectives.33 However 
some problems identified with Basel II are attributed to pro cyclicality and to the fact that not all 
material  credit  risks  in  the  trading  book  are  adequately  accounted  for  in  the  current  capital 
requirements.34 The pro cyclical nature of Basel II has been criticised since “capital requirements 
for credit risk as a probability of default of an exposure decreases in the economic upswing and 
increases during the downturn”35 – hence resulting in capital requirements which fluctuate over the 
cycle.  Other  identified36 consequential  effects  include  the  fact  that  fluctuations  in  such  capital 
requirements may result in credit institutions raising their capital during periods when its is costly 
for them to implement such a rise – which has the potential of inducing banks to cut back on their 
lending. It is concluded that “risk sensitive capital requirements should have pro cyclical effects 
principally on undercapitalised banks.”37
According to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), an earlier recognition of loan losses, which could 
have been facilitated by relevant disclosures about loan loss provisioning, could have reduced pro 
cyclical  effects  which  occurred  during  the  recent  crisis.38 Not  only does  the  FSF propose  that 
amendments be made to the Basel II framework - amendments which are aimed at reducing banks’ 
disincentives  to  increase their  level  of  provisions for  loan losses,  it  is  also of  the opinion that 
measures  aimed  at  improving  market  discipline  could  also  help  in  reducing  procyclicality  and 
diversity.39 Furthermore,  incentives  which  would  encourage  banks  to  retain  liquidity  could  be 
introduced – however , such incentives should be granted whilst striving to comply with the aims 
and objectives of Basel – particularly those aimed at enhancing a regulatory framework which is 
more aligned with economic and regulatory capital.  As acknowledged by the Basel Committee, 
„certain incentives which assume the form of capital reductions are considered to impose minimum 
operational  standards in recognition that poor management of operational risks (including legal 
risks) could render such risk mitigants of effectively little or no value and that although partial 
mitigation  is  rewarded,  banks  will  be  required  to  hold  capital  against  residual  risks”.  Hence 
incentives  should  also  adequately  account  for  situations  where  poor  management  systems  may 
operate in institutions which are supposed to have risk mitigants.
As well as drawing attention to the fact that capital buffers may not actually mitigate the cyclical 
effects of bank regulation,40 regulators are also advised to give due consideration to the effects of 
risk weights on bank portfolio behaviour when implementing regulations.
5) As its fifth proposal, a global minimum liquidity standard for internationally active banks is 
to  be introduced by the Committee.  This  will  include a  30 day liquidity coverage ratio 
requirement which is underpinned by a longer term structural liquidity ratio. The framework 
will  also  incorporate  a  common set  of  monitoring  metrics  to  assist  supervisors  in  their 
analysis  and identification of risk trends.  both at  the bank and system wide level.  Such 
standards and monitoring metrics will serve to supplement the Basel Committee’s Principles 
for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision.
III. Other points highlighted by the Committee
- The review of the need for additional capital, liquidity or other supervisory measures aimed 
at reducing externalities generated by systemically important institutions.
- Recognition that severity of the economic and financial crisis is attributed to the fact that 
excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage had been accumulated by banking sectors  of 
many  countries  whilst  many  banks  were  retaining  insufficient  liquidity  buffers. 
Consequences resulting from this include the inability of the banking system to absorb the 
resulting systemic trading and credit  losses .  Further,  the banking system was unable to 
manage the “re intermediation” of large off balance exposures which had accumulated.
- Aggravation  of  the  crisis  owing  to  pro  cyclical  effects  and  the  interconnectedness  of 
systemic  institutions  –  such  interconnectedness  being  triggered  by  a  range  of  complex 
transactions.
Systemic risks and the central role assumed by banks in relation to liquidity serves as greater
justification for regulation with respect to banks. “The fundamental role of banks in the maturity 
transformation of short-term deposits into long-term loans makes banks inherently vulnerable to 
liquidity risk, both of an institution-specific nature and that which affects markets as a whole.“41
In relation to the securities markets, information asymmetry appears to constitute a greater basis for 
regulation. However, the existence of information asymmetry within the banking42sector has the 
potential to generate systemic effects within the banking sector – consequences whose effects, it 
could be said,  could have greater  repercussions  than if  such were to  originate  from within the 
securities markets.
The link between liquidity and systemic risks as illustrated in the ECB’s Financial Stability Review, 
is attributed to the “destruction of specific knowledge43 which banks have about their borrowers and 
the reduction of the common pool of liquidity.”44 The importance of the link between liquidity risks 
and systemic risks within the banking sector is highlighted by the consequences attributed to the 
reluctance of banks to retain liquidity - given the cost  of holding liquidity.45 The consequential 
shortfalls of liquidity as reflected by on and off balance sheet maturity mismatches accentuates the 
importance of the role assumed by central banks in the funding of bank balance sheets.46
1. Mitigating the Procyclical Effects of Basel II
According to a report,47 the two principal solutions which have been endorsed by the Turner Review 
and the DeLarosiere Report, and which are considered to have the potential to reduce pro cyclical 
effects48 induced by the CRD and Basel II, include: 1) The requirement that banks “hold bigger 
reserves during good times - hence limiting credit and risk expansion in good times and storing up 
capital to be used during bad times” (2) “Increasing risk-weighting on a range of assets because this 
also restricts balance sheet expansion”. 
Another proposal put forward as an optimal means of rectifying Basel II's procyclical effects – as 
illustrated through the “amplification of business cycle fluctuations”, involves the utilisation of a 
“business cycle multiplier of the Basel II capital requirements that is increasing in the rate of growth 
of  the  GDP”.  Under  such  a  scheme,  it  is  argued,  riskier  “banks  would  face  higher  capital 
requirements without regulation exacerbating credit bubbles and crunches.”49
Other mechanisms provided under the CRD as means of mitigating pro cyclicality within the capital 
requirements framework include:50
− The use of downturn Loss Given Default (LGD) estimates, PD estimates being based on 
long  data  series,  technical  adjustments  made  to  the  risk  weight  function,  stress  testing 
requirements and Pillar  2 supervisory review process. It  is  acknowledged, however,  that 
more  measures  may  be  required  to  mitigate  the  procyclical  effects  of  the  capital 
requirements framework. Options provided include those aimed at reducing its cyclical risk 
sensitivity,  measures  which  enhance  its  risk capture,  and  the  intentional  introduction  of 
counter-cyclical buffers (comprising capital and/or provisions). 
2. Financial Stability Forum Recommendations Aimed at Mitigating Procyclicality 
In its report51 on “Addressing Procyclicality in the Financial System”, the Financial Stability 
Forum’s recommendations to mitigate mechanisms that amplify procyclicality was extended to 
three areas:52
i) bank capital framework, ii) bank loan loss provisions as well as iii) leverage and valuation
issues. 
A summary of the recommendations relating to capital, as provided in the Report of the Financial 
Stability Forum is as follows:53
• “That the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) should strengthen the 
regulatory capital framework so that the quality and level of capital in the banking system 
increase during strong economic conditions and can be drawn down during periods of 
economic and financial stress;
• That the BCBS should revise the market risk framework of Basel II to reduce the reliance on 
cyclical VAR-based capital estimates;
• The BCBS should supplement the risk-based capital requirement with a simple, non-risk 
based measure to help contain the build-up of leverage in the banking system and put a floor 
under the Basel II framework;
• Supervisors should use the Basel Committee's enhanced stress testing practices as a critical 
part of the Pillar 2 supervisory review process to validate the adequacy of banks’ capital 
buffers above the minimum regulatory capital requirement;”
“That the BCBS should monitor the impact of the Basel II framework and make appropriate 
adjustments to dampen excessive cyclicality of the minimum capital requirements;”
“That the BCBS carry out regular assessments of the risk coverage of the capital framework 
in relation to financial developments and banks’ evolving risk profiles and make timely 
enhancements.”
3. Risk Management and Governance
“Stress  testing  is  an  important  risk  management  tool  –  particularly  for  counter  party  risk 
management.”54 
According  to  the  Basel  Committee,55 “  as  public  disclosure  increases  certainty  in  the  market, 
improves transparency, facilitates valuation, and strengthens market discipline, it is important that 
banks publicly disclose information on a regular basis that  enables market participants to make 
informed decisions about the soundness of their liquidity risk management framework and liquidity 
position.” The involvement of market participants in the process whereby the Committee strives to 
facilitate market discipline through the development of “a set of disclosure requirements which will 
allow such market participants to assess key pieces of information on the scope of application, 
capital, risk exposures, risk assessment processes, and hence capital adequacy of an institution“56 
constitutes a vital means whereby effective corporate governance could be facilitated.
Recent  reports  have  revealed  the  lack  of  knowledge  demonstrated  by  financial  institutions  in 
relation to risks involved when engaged with “businesses and structured credit products.”57 The fact 
that banks “did not adhere to the fundamental tenets of sound financial judgement and prudent risk 
management” was also highlighted.58
Greater efforts have been undertaken to involve market participants by encouraging them to assess a 
bank’s risk profile. Such proactive efforts are more desirable than “allowing markets to evolve and 
decide.”59 As identified by the Basel Committee, “improvements in risk management must evolve to 
keep pace with rapid financial innovation.60 Furthermore, it states that “ this is particularly relevant 
for  participants  in  evolving  and  rapidly  growing  businesses.61 Innovation  has  increased  the 
complexity and potential illiquidity of structured credit products – which in turn, could make such 
products not only more difficult to value and hedge, but also lead to inadvertent increases in overall 
risk.”62 “Further,  the increased growth of complex investor specific products may result  in thin 
markets  that  are illiquid – which could expose a bank to  large losses in times of stress,  if  the 
associated risks are not well understood and managed in a timely and effective manner. Stress tests 
have been identified as means whereby investors’ uncertainty about the quality of bank balance 
sheets, could be eliminated.63
The Committee's acknowledgement of negative incentives arising from the use of external ratings to 
determine regulatory capital requirements and proposals to mitigate these incentives  64 is well - 
founded – however, regulators will also be able to manage, with greater ability, systemic risks to the 
financial system during such periods when firms which are highly leveraged become reluctant to 
lend  where  more  market  participants  such  as  credit  rating  agencies,  could  be  engaged  in  the 
supervisory process.65 The Annex to Pro cyclicality in the Accompanying Document amending the 
Capital Requirements Directive66 not only importantly emphasises the fact that regulatory capital 
requirements do not constitute the sole determinants of how much capital banks should hold, but 
also highlights the role of credit rating agencies in compelling banks to increase their capital levels 
even where such institution may be complying with regulatory requirements.
Further  as  rightly  acknowledged  by the  Committee,  “recent  experience  has  shown that  banks’ 
internal credit models have not performed well. Permitting banks to use their own internal models 
to estimate the capital requirements for securitisation exposures could increase pressure to permit 
the use of such models in Basel II more broadly. Thus, while there have been concerns expressed 
about the use of external ratings under the Basel II framework, including that reliance on external 
ratings could undermine incentives to conduct independent internal assessments of the credit quality 
of exposures, the removal of external ratings from the Basel II framework could raise additional 
issues for determining regulatory capital requirements.“67
C. Conclusion
As well as the inability of bank capital adequacy requirements, on their own, to address funding and 
liquidity problems, the need for greater focus on Pillar 3 of Basel II, namely, market discipline, and 
growing justification for greater measures aimed at extending capital rules to the securities markets, 
are factors which are becoming more apparent. 
Even though markets should be allowed to evolve, checks and controls should exist to ensure that 
such market activities are effectively managed and controlled. Management information systems 
(MIS) and banks’ credit risk models should be flexible (and not overly sensitive) in order to adapt to 
the  evolving  market  whilst  providing  for  some  element  of  control.  The  Basel  Committee 
furthermore,  acknowledges  the  role  assumed  by  management  information  systems  and  risk 
management processes in assisting the bank “to identify and aggregate similar risk exposures across 
the firm, including legal entities, and asset types (eg loans, derivatives and structured products).”68
The operation of risk mitigants in bank institutions does not justify a reduction in the capital levels 
to be retained by such banks – since banks operating with risk mitigants could still be considered 
inefficient operators of their management information systems (MIS), internal control systems, and 
risk management processes. The fact that banks possess risk mitigants does not necessarily imply 
that  they are  complying with Basel  Core Principles  for  effective supervision (particularly Core 
Principles 7 and 17). Core Principle 7 not only stipulates that “banks and banking groups satisfy 
supervisory  requirements  of  a  comprehensive  management  process,  ensure  that  this  identifies, 
evaluates, monitors and controls or mitigates all material risks and assesses their overall capital 
adequacy  in  relation  to  their  risk  profile,  but  that  such  processes  correspond  to  the  size  and 
complexity of the institution.” Certain incentives which assume the form of capital reductions are 
considered by the Basel Committee to “impose minimum operational standards in recognition that 
poor management of operational risks (including legal risks) could render such risk mitigants of 
effectively little or no value and that although partial mitigation is rewarded, banks will be required 
to hold capital against residual risks”.
Information disclosure should be encouraged for several reasons, amongst which include the fact 
that  imperfect  information is  considered  to  be a  cause of  market  failure  –  which “reduces  the 
maximisation potential of regulatory competition”, and also because disclosure requirements would 
contribute to the reduction of risks which could be generated when granting reduced capital level 
rewards to banks who may have poor management systems.
Response to Consultative Document –
International Framework For Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and 
Monitoring
A. Introduction
The Basel  Committee’s  recent  focus  is  reflected  through its  goals  of  not  only intensifying  the 
“resilience of internationally active banks to liquidity stresses”, but also intensifying international 
harmonisation of liquidity risk supervision. These efforts are aimed at consolidating recent work 
which  culminated  in  the  issue  of  the  Principles  for  Sound  Liquidity  Risk  Management  and 
Supervision.69
As part of measures aimed at facilitating “further consolidation and promotion of consistency in 
international  liquidity  risk  supervision”,  and  in  response  to  the  “inaccurate  and  ineffective 
management of liquidity risk” – such ineffective management being a prominent feature of the 
financial crisis, the Basel Committee has developed a minimum set of monitoring tools to be used 
in  the  “ongoing  monitoring  of  the  liquidity  risk  exposures  of  cross  border  institutions  and  in 
communicating these exposures amongst home and host supervisors.”70
This  paper  is  structured  in  accordance  with  identified  components  which  are  considered  to  be 
essential  to  the  successful  implementation  of  the  (two fold)  topics  of  discussion of  this  paper, 
namely,  monitoring  and  liquidity  risk  measurements.  The  importance  of  successfully 
communicating  results  obtained  from  monitoring  and  measuring  such  risks,  and  the  role  of 
corporate  governance  in  ensuring  such  effective  communication,  constitutes  a  recurring  theme 
throughout  this  paper.  The  identified  components  are  as  follows:  i)  Corporate  governance  (ii) 
Internal controls (iii) Disclosure (iv) Management of risk (v) Substance over form (vi) Transparency
As well as highlighting the interdependence of these components, the paper also aims to accentuate 
the importance of individual components. Whilst no hierarchy of importance is assigned to these 
components, corporate governance and internal controls are two components which are analysed in 
greater  depth (than other  components).  Furthermore,  corporate governance could be accorded a 
status of greater importance than internal controls  having regard to the fact  that  whilst  internal 
controls relate to a very vital control aspect of an organisation, corporate governance relates to all 
processes – be it decision making, control, production, performance, within a company/bank.
Disclosure  and  transparency  embody  the  same  goals,  whilst  the  effective  management  and 
measurement of risks, and liquidity risks in particular, are aims which the internal control function 
and management should strive to achieve.  The theme “substance over form” draws attention to 
creative accounting practices  and the need for greater  emphasis  on principles  based regulation. 
Creative accounting and “window dressing” of figures in the financial statements are ever recurring 
issues arising from corporate collapses – as also recently highlighted by the recent crises which 
involved Lehman Brothers.
Whilst the danger of formalism lies in the exercise of “creative compliance”,71 inherent problems of 
anti formalism are considered to include:72
- The fact  that  citizens  have  the  right  to  know exactly  what  is  prohibited  in  advance  of 
behaviour rather than in retrospect
- That broad rules are imprecise and over inclusive
- That anti formalism could result in ineffective control - where it is impossible to implement
Principles based regulation (PBR) is more advantageous than a rules based approach – owing to the 
fact that off balance73 sheet debt could result from the direct application of rules – without being 
able to consider the substance of the transaction and because the implemented standards do not 
allow such consideration.  As its  secondary argument74,  this  paper will  seek to demonstrate  that 
detailed rules could still operate within a system of principles based regulation – whilst enabling a 
consideration of the substance of the transactions which are involved.
Regulatory standards implemented by the Basel Committee in its recent document75 provide for 
“jurisdiction-specific  conditions”  –  for  example,  the  percentage  of  potential  run-off  of  retail 
deposits  which  is  partially  dependent  on  the  structure  of  a  jurisdiction’s  deposit  insurance 
scheme.”76 Furthermore, the Committee highlights that “in these cases, the parameters should be 
transparent  and clearly outlined in the regulations of each jurisdiction.”77 It  also adds that this 
would provide clarity both within the jurisdiction as well as across borders concerning the precise 
parameters  that  the  banks  are  capturing  in  these  metrics,  and  that  there  was  need  for  public 
disclosures in respect of regulatory standards.78
Good corporate governance would “provide proper incentives for the board and management to 
pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders.”79 The dual faceted 
aspects  of  corporate  governance  relate  not  only  to  the  accountability  of  management  to 
shareholders,  but  also  to  the  supervision  and  monitoring  of  management  performance.  Good 
corporate  governance  should  facilitate  effective  monitoring,  effective  management  of  internal 
controls and risks, effective disclosure and transparency.
In considering the topics of discussion, namely, liquidity risk measurements and monitoring, this 
paper will commence with a section dedicated to liquidity risk (and risk measurements), along with 
developments which have triggered the need for particular monitoring tools  - both in response to 
global developments and with particular reference to the increasing prominence of liquidity risks.
The ever growing prominence and importance of liquidity in prudential supervision constitutes a 
vital reason which justifies the need for a prudential supervisory framework which does not merely 
(and excessively) rely on capital adequacy requirements within such a framework.
Some arguments which revolve around the inadequacies of capital adequacy standards include the 
fact that:80
“Capital ratios may be of limited value as indicators of actual risk since reported capital positions 
do not reflect the real causes of most bank failures ( the real causes of bank failures being fraud or 
fast  depletion  of  the  banks’ resources).  The  international  minimum  ration  of  8%  lacks  any 
theoretical justification. Risk related measurement of bank assets is not only deeply flawed, but also 
triggers substantial distortions in the relative demand for bank assets. Since banks are in direct 
competition with investment firms, so far as securities activities are concerned, the imposition of 
capital burdens on banks erodes their ability to compete.”
Paragraph 56 of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk 
Management and Supervision states that 
“A bank should have a reliable management information system designed to provide the board of 
directors,  senior  management  and other  appropriate  personnel  with timely and forward-looking 
information on the liquidity position of the bank. The management information system should have 
the  ability  to  calculate  liquidity  positions  in  all  of  the  currencies  in  which  the  bank conducts 
business – both on a subsidiary/branch basis in all jurisdictions in which the bank is active and on 
an aggregate group basis. It should capture all sources of liquidity risk, including contingent risks 
and the related triggers and those arising from new activities, and have the ability to deliver more 
granular and time sensitive information during stress events. To effectively manage and monitor its 
net  funding requirements,  a  bank should have the ability to  calculate  liquidity positions  on an 
intraday basis, on a day-to-day basis for the shorter time horizons, and over a series of more distant 
time periods thereafter. The management information system should be used in day-to-day liquidity 
risk  management  to  monitor  compliance  with  the  bank’s  established  policies,  procedures  and 
limits.”81
B. Liquidity Risks
In February 2008, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published a paper titled “Liquidity 
Risk Management and Supervisory Challenges”, a paper which highlighted the fact that many banks 
had ignored the application of a number of basic principles of liquidity risk management during 
periods of abundant liquidity.82 An extensive review of its 2000 “Sound Practices for Managing 
Liquidity in Banking Organisations” was also carried out by the Basel Committee as a means of 
addressing matters and issues arising from the financial markets and lessons from the Financial 
Crises.83 In order to consolidate on the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision’s Principles for 
Sound  Liquidity  Risk  Management  and  Supervision  of  September  2008,  which  should  lead  to 
improved management and supervision of liquidity risks of individual banks, supervisory bodies 
will be required “ to develop tools and policies to address the pro cyclical behaviour of liquidity at 
the aggregate level.84
The Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision of September 2008 are aimed 
at providing “consistent supervisory expectations” on principal elements such as “board and senior 
management oversight; the establishment of policies and risk tolerance; the use of liquidity risk 
management tools such as comprehensive cash flow forecasting, limits and liquidity scenario stress 
testing;  and  the  maintenance  of  a  sufficient  cushion  of  high  quality  liquid  assets  to  address 
contingent liquidity needs.”85
The  three  aspects  to  pro  cyclicality86 –  as  highlighted  in  the  Impact  Assessment  Document 
amending the Capital Requirements Directive, have the potential to trigger a chain reaction. Starting 
with remuneration schemes, the impact of these on management incentives, could have a positive or 
negative effect on bank regulations (such as Basel II or the CRD). Such regulations could then 
mitigate or exacerbate pro cyclical effects – depending on the effectiveness of capital adequacy 
rules. A positive effect of such rules would reduce the tendency of banks to cut back on lending 
during economic “busts” whilst incentives to retain liquidity would be increased – hence reducing 
the likelihood of the occurrence of maturity mismatches.
The link between liquidity and systemic risks as illustrated in the ECB’s Financial Stability Review, 
is attributed to the “destruction of specific knowledge87 which banks have about their
borrowers and the reduction of the common pool of liquidity.”88 The importance of the link between 
liquidity risks and systemic risks within the banking sector is  highlighted by the consequences 
attributed to the reluctance of banks to retain liquidity - given the cost of holding liquidity.89 The 
consequential shortfalls of liquidity as reflected by on and off balance
sheet maturity mismatches accentuates the importance of the role assumed by central banks in
the funding of bank balance sheets.90
The link between liquidity and systemic risks is also accentuated under paragraph 77 of the BCBS 
Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision of September 2008. Principle 8 
states that:
“A bank should actively manage its  intraday liquidity positions and risks to meet payment and 
settlement  obligations  on  a  timely  basis  under  both  normal  and  stressed  conditions  and  thus 
contribute to the smooth functioning of payment and settlement systems.”
Paragraph 7791 elaborates on this by highlighting the reasons why “intraday liquidity management” 
constitutes an important component of a bank’s “broader liquidity management strategy.” It goes on 
to state that a bank’s failure to manage intraday liquidity effectively could result in its inability to 
meet payment obligations as they fall due, - hence generating consequences, not only for its own 
liquidity position, but also that of other parties. It illustrates how this could occur in two ways, 
namely: 
- “The fact that that counter parties may view the failure to settle payments when expected, as a 
sign of financial weakness – which in turn could result not only in payments to the bank being 
delayed or withheld, but also in further aggravation of liquidity pressures.
- It  also could leave counterparties unexpectedly short  of funds,  impair  those counterparties’ 
ability  to  meet  payment  obligations,  and  disrupt  the  smooth  functioning  of  payment  and 
settlement systems. Given the interdependencies that exist among systems, a bank’s failure to 
meet certain critical payments could lead to liquidity dislocations that cascade quickly across 
many systems and institutions. If risk controls are overwhelmed, these dislocations could alter 
many banks’ intraday or overnight funding needs, including their demands for central bank 
credit,  and  potentially  affect  conditions  in  money markets.  The  delay of  other  less  critical 
payments  also might  cause other  institutions  to  postpone  their  own payments,  cause  many 
banks to face increased uncertainty about their overnight funding needs and potentially increase 
the impact of any operational outages.”
Liquidity is considered to be “highly procyclical, growing in good times and drying up in times of 
stress.”92 During the build up to the present crisis,  banks and other financial institutions had an 
incentive to minimise the cost of holding liquidity.93 Given the fact that liquidity could also be pro 
cyclical and given its role in the recent crisis, perhaps four dimensions to pro cyclicality should 
have been introduced in the Impact Assessment Document94 amending the Capital Requirements 
Directive – incorporating liquidity as a fourth heading.
The growing importance of formalisation within the bank regulatory framework is also attributed to 
the gaps which exist within a discretionary based system of bank supervision – as was revealed in 
the aftermath of Baring Plc’s collapse. The recent crisis has also highlighted the need for formal risk 
assessment models – as demonstrated by the demise of Lehman Brothers where the failures of 
auditors to detect balance sheet irregularities (owing to  creative accounting practices) was brought 
to light.
The formal framework for the measurement of capital adequacy at European Community level, as 
exemplified  by  the  International  Convergence  of  Capital  Measurements  and  Capital 
Standards(Revised Framework), namely Basel 2, is to be commended, not only because of “the 
need  for  a  consistent  framework  for  the  reporting  and  comparative  analysis  of  bank  capital 
positions, the demand of regulated institutions for transparency and equality in the application of 
regulatory standards”, but also because of “the exigencies of the international convergence process 
– which requires the transparent and uniform implementation of harmonised rules by the regulators 
of every country.”95
As part of measures aimed at consolidating and “promoting consistency in international liquidity 
risk supervision”, and in response to the “inaccurate and ineffective management of liquidity risk” – 
as  was  prominently  highlighted  during  the  recent  financial  crisis,  the  Basel  Committee  has 
developed a “minimum set of monitoring tools to be used in the ongoing monitoring of the liquidity 
risk exposures of cross border institutions and in communicating these exposures amongst home 
and host supervisors.”96
The Liquidity Coverage Ratio97 and the Net Stable Funding Ratio98 are two regulatory standards for 
liquidity  risk  which  serve  the  purpose  of  attaining  the  objectives  of  “promoting  short-term 
resiliency of the liquidity risk profile of institutions” (by ensuring that they have adequate high 
quality liquid resources to survive during periods of extreme stress which last for about one month) 
and “promoting resiliency over longer-term periods” ( through the creation of additional incentives 
for banks to fund their activities with more stable sources of funding on an ongoing basis).99
In addition to the above-mentioned standards, the Basel Committee recommends that supervisors 
also implement designated monitoring tools on a consistent basis. Such monitoring tools, along with 
the  standards,  are  intended  to  provide  supervisors  with  information  which  should  aid  their 
assessment  of  liquidity  risks  attributed  to  a  particular  bank.100 These  monitoring  tools  include: 
Contractual Maturity Mismatch, Concentration of Funding,  Available Unencumbered Assets and 
market – related monitoring tools.101
C. Disclosure 
As well as the need for greater focus on liquidity risk, there is also the need for greater reliance on 
disclosure requirements. This will be facilitated through an effective monitoring process whereby 
identified risks are effectively communicated across all levels of management.
Enhanced  transparency does  not  only  have  the  potential  to  “improve  an  understanding  of  the 
mechanism at play in structured finance”, but also facilitate the identification of risks and ensure 
that  risks are  well  controlled.  102 Risky loans  which were “repackaged and sold to institutional 
investors” – some of whom did not fully comprehend the implications of the transactions they were 
engaged in (or about to be engaged in), and the inherent risks associated with those transactions, are 
considered to be contributory factors to the 2007/09 Financial Crisis.103
Regulators will be able to gain greater access to vital information which is required for effective 
performance of their functions where duties are imposed on third parties, such as external auditors, 
in  relation  to  the  disclosure  of  information  which  is  necessary  and  required  for  the  efficient 
performance of the regulators’ activities – as opposed to a right to report.
The relationship between supervisory authorities and the external auditors of a credit institution and 
the duties of these auditors was identified as an important lesson from the BCCI case.104 Because of 
auditors’ access to financial undertakings’ accounts and other essential documents and information, 
they assume a vital position in the overall supervisory process. An analysis of BCCI revealed that 
measures, additional to those already existing, needed to be taken to eliminate the opaqueness of 
financial  structures  and  strengthen  cooperation  between  all  bodies  or  persons  involved  in  the 
supervision of such complex financial structures.105
As a result, the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision issued “minimum standards” which lay 
down rules for effective consolidated supervision and cooperation between supervisory authorities. 
This was not only aimed at strengthening international co operation between prudential supervisors, 
but also to improve transparency of financial, and in particular, group structures.
D. The Importance of Effective Management of Internal Controls
“Banks identified as having control problems have been characterised by organisational structures 
in which responsibilities were not clearly defined: hence (1) No senior management monitored the 
performance of activities (carried out within the organisation) closely to observe unusual activities 
(2) No senior management had a comprehensive understanding of the activities and how profits 
were being generated.”106
The collapse of Barings in1995 which was attributed not only to lack of quality and employee 
deception,  also  brought  the  issue  of  internal  controls  and  management  systems  to  the  fore.107 
Barings collapse illustrated weaknesses in the bank regulator’s supervisory regime - which included 
flaws  within  its  evaluation  of  internal  controls  at  banks,  flaws  inherent  in  the  internal 
communication within levels of management of the bank regulator, and the weaknesses in the way 
the bank regulator’s existing rules were applied.108
 The  Basel  Committee  categorised  into  five  groups,  types  of  control  breakdowns  which  are 
characteristic of ailing banks and these are as follows:109
- Lack of adequate management oversight and accountability, and failure to develop a strong 
control culture within the bank110
- Inadequate recognition and assessment of the risk of certain banking activities, whether on or 
off balance sheet
- The absence or failure of key control structures and activities such as segregation of duties, 
approvals, verifications, reconciliations and reviews of operating performance
- Inadequate communication of information between levels of management within the bank – 
particularly the communication of information to higher ranked officials (senior management)
- Inadequate or ineffective audit programmes and monitoring activities
E. The  Contribution  of  Corporate  Governance  to  an  Effective  System  of  Internal 
Controls
Various corporate collapses have resulted in changes to financial reporting, corporate governance 
and audit.111 The emphasis on internal controls and risk management emerged from realisation that 
due  to  change  in  the  business  environment,  even  effective  safeguards  may  be  insufficient  to 
eliminate all possibilities of failure.112
Keasy and Wright define corporate governance as the “examination of the structures and processes 
associated with production, decision making, control and so on within an organisation.”113 The two 
aspects  of  governance  are  considered  to  be  i)  Supervision  and  monitoring  of  management 
performance (the enterprise aspect) and ii) ensuring accountability of management to shareholders 
and other stakeholders (the accountability aspect).114
The feedback effects of corporate governance into the liquidity and systemic risk mechanisms are 
illustrated thus: 
“Poor corporate governance may contribute to bank failures, which could pose significant public 
costs and consequences due to their potential impact on any applicable deposit insurance systems 
and the possibility of broader macro economic implications, such as contagion risk and impact on 
payments  systems.  Furthermore,  poor  corporate  governance  could  result  in  markets  losing 
confidence in the ability of a bank to properly manage its assets and liabilities, including deposits, 
which could in turn, trigger a bank run or liquidity crisis.”115
As well  as a robust system of  internal  controls  (which incorporates  internal  and external  audit 
functions), the implementation of i) corporate values, codes of conduct, standards of appropriate 
behaviour  and  the  system  used  in  ensuring  compliance  with  these,  ii)  a  clear  allocation  of 
responsibilities and decision making authorities, iii)  the establishment of a system which would 
guarantee efficient interaction and collaboration between the board of directors, senior management 
and auditors, and iv) special monitoring of risk exposures where conflicts of interest are likely to be 
high, are considered to be crucial to ensuring that sound corporate governance operates within an 
organisation.116
Furthermore,  sound corporate  governance practices  are  considered to  require  “  appropriate  and 
effective legal, regulatory and institutional foundations.”117 Even though factors such as the system 
of business laws and accounting standards which prevail in respective jurisdictions are considered 
to  be  factors  which  operate  beyond  the  scope  of  banking  supervision,  the  inclusion  of  four 
important forms of oversight are considered sufficient not only in ensuring that appropriate checks 
and balances exist, but that an effective system of corporate governance can be achieved.118 The 
types of oversight include: 
“(1)  oversight  by the board of  directors  or  supervisory board;  (2)  oversight  by individuals  not 
involved in the day-to-day running of the various  business areas;  (3) direct  line supervision of 
different business areas; and (4) independent risk management, compliance and audit functions. In 
addition, it is important that key personnel are fit and proper for their jobs. “119
The contribution  and the  role  assumed by senior  management  in  ensuring that  internal  control 
systems are effectively managed, is reflected through the Principles for the Assessment of Internal 
Control  Systems.120 The  importance  of  monitoring  and  the  rectification  of  deficiencies  within 
internal  control  systems  is  reflected  under  principles  10-12.121 Principle  10  highlights  the 
importance  of  monitoring  on  a  frequent  and  ongoing  basis  whilst  principles  11  and  12  draw 
attention to the importance of effective collaboration and communication between highly trained 
competent staff, the board of directors, audit committees and senior management.122
According to paragraph 84 of the BCBS Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and
Supervision of September 2008, internal coordination across business lines is vital towards ensuring 
that effective controls over liquidity outflows are achieved.123 In relation to examples of actions 
which supervisors could adopt , as means of responding to banks with liquidity risk management 
weaknesses or excessive liquidity risk, that which “requires actions by the bank to strengthen its 
management of liquidity risk through improvements in internal policies, controls or reporting to 
senior  management  and  the  board”  is  considered  to  have  the  greatest  potential  to  address 
deficiencies in a bank’s liquidity risk management process or liquidity position.124
As observed by the Basel Committee,125 “most banks that have experienced losses from internal 
control problems did not effectively monitor their internal control systems. Often the systems did 
not  have  the  necessary  built-in  ongoing  monitoring  processes  and  the  separate  evaluations 
performed  were  either  not  adequate  or  were  not  acted  upon appropriately  by management.”126 
Furthermore it  highlights that  such failures to monitor adequately commence with a “failure to 
consider and react  to day-to-day information provided to line management and other personnel 
indicating unusual activity – such as exceeded exposure limits, customer accounts in proprietary 
business activities or lack of current financial statements from borrowers.”127
In implementing the regulatory standards and monitoring tools which are highlighted by the Basel 
Committee  in  its  consultative  document,128 a  supervisory  approach  which  not  incorporates  the 
expertise of external auditors, but which is also more inclined to an on site system based approach is 
recommended. In supporting this view, reference is made to lessons learned from the collapse of 
Barings where it was noted by the Treasury Committee that “it was due to the discretionary basis of 
the  supervisor’s  approach  to  supervision  that  there  was  limited  ability  to  detect  events  at 
Barings.”129
The regulatory standards and monitoring tools set out in the BIS Consultative Document130 are 
therefore supported on the basis of their ability to facilitate a more formal approach to supervision 
which would reduce the scope for flexibility (scope for creative accounting practices and “window 
dressing” of balance sheet figures) where an on – site approach to supervision is implemented.
F. On site and Off-site Supervision
Principle 21 of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Supervision, Supervisory Reporting states 
that  “Supervisors must have a means of collecting, reviewing and analysing prudential reports and 
statistical returns from banks on both a solo and a consolidated basis, and a means of independent 
verification of these reports, through either on-site examinations or use of external experts.”
According to Vieten131 bank regulation has followed two trends, namely: supervision has become 
increasingly formalized and dependent on quantitative tools, and secondly, regulatory duties are 
being pushed down a regulatory pyramid to include external auditors and to enlist the resources of 
regulatees.
External auditors, even though they do not constitute by definition, part of a banking organisation, 
immensely  impact  the  quality  of  internal  controls  “through  their  audit  activities  –  which  also 
includes  discussions  with  management  and  recommendations  for  improvement  to  internal 
controls.”132 “External auditors provide an important feedback on the effectiveness of the internal 
control system.”133
Off site supervision is synonymous with monitoring and involves the regulator’s use of external 
auditors’ expertise. It also involves the receipt and analysis of financial statements and statistical 
returns submitted to the supervisors. Off site monitoring often has the benefits of being able to 
identify  potential  problems,  particularly  during  intervals  between  on-  site  inspections,  thereby 
providing early detection and acting as trigger for corrective action before problems become more 
serious.134
On  site  work  is  usually  done  by  the  examination  staff  of  the  bank  supervisory  agency  or 
commissioned  by  supervisors  but  may  be  undertaken  by  external  auditors.  Furthermore,  it  is 
contended that on-site examinations are frequently implemented by banking supervisory authorities 
which posses the legal basis or other arrangements to direct the scope of the work carried out by 
external auditors.135
Ongoing monitoring is contrasted with separate evaluations. It is highlighted that whilst ongoing 
monitoring  activities  not  only  provide  the  advantage  of  “quickly  detecting  and  correcting 
deficiencies in the system”, but are also most effective “when the system of internal control is 
integrated into the operating environment and produces regular reports for review,” that separate 
evaluations usually detect problems “only after the fact.”136 However separate evaluations also offer 
the  advantage  of  providing  an  organisation  with  “fresh  and  comprehensive”  insight  into  the 
effectiveness of monitoring activities  –  such activities  being undertaken by staff  from different 
departments which include the business function, financial control and internal audit.137
G. Monitoring Compliance and Enforcement
Principles Based Regulation
A discretionary based approach to regulation, whilst encouraging greater possibilities for regulatory 
capture, appears to be more congruent with principles based regulation. However it is possible to 
implement a system of regulation which combines increased formalised procedures and/or detailed 
rules - whilst giving due consideration to the substance of transactions.
“Principles provide the framework in which firms can organize their own processes to achieve the 
outcomes the regulator seeks – the regulator in turn, depends on firms to adopt an attitude to the 
regulatory regime (which is one which aims to go beyond minimal compliance with rules).”138
Principles based regulation is not only advantageous because it allows management of a bank or 
firm  to  take  into  consideration  the  substance  of  transactions,  but  because  “principles  impose 
outcomes to be achieved – not detailed processes for achieving them.”139 As well as being linked to 
meta regulation, principles based regulation facilitates a system whereby principles “communicate 
regulatory objectives and promote behaviour which will achieve those objectives.”140
Principles based regulation, thus, would not only reduce the scope for “creative compliance” – since 
the substance of transactions should be considered by management,  but also has the benefit  of 
providing a more flexible and responsive approach to regulation as the subsequent section will seek 
to demonstrate.
Principles based regulation is considered to comprise of 3 elements, namely:141
• A particular type of rule
• A focus on outcomes and
• A focus on senior management responsibility in ensuring these outcomes are achieved
Furthermore,  three  forms  of  principles  based  regulation,  namely:  “formal  principles  based 
regulation; substantive principles based regulation and full principles based regulation”, have been 
suggested.142 For the purposes of this paper, focus will be restricted to substantive principles based 
regulation.
Five classes of regulatory practices which could characterise substantive principles based 
regulation include:143 “The particular  mode of  interpretation-  that  is,  the  approach taken in  the 
interpretative  process;  particular  enforcement  style;  an  orientation  to  outcomes;  a  relocation  of 
responsibilities  for  working out  the practical  application of  the  provisions;  and an  explicit  and 
developed reliance on management based regulation.”
The effectiveness of rules and regulation is dependent, not only on the monitoring processes and 
tools used in such processes, but also the effectiveness of the enforcement of those rules. For this 
reason,  focus  will  be  dedicated  to  the  second  characteristic  of  substantive  principles  based 
regulation– which is indeed a “critical” and defining feature of principles based regulation.
According to Black, the adoption of the “responsive” enforcement approach is justified on the basis 
that “neither negotiative approaches nor deterrence based approaches are effective on their own and 
that instead, regulators should implement a mixture of both, that is, first negotiate, then if the firm 
still does not deliver substantive compliance, regulators should gradually move up the enforcement 
pyramid, applying sanctions of increasing severity until it does.”144 She adds weight to  Baldwin’s 
argument145 by stating that “those who know what they are meant to be doing and are generally 
inclined to do it (“the well intentioned and well informed”) , are best dealt with using a negotiating 
strategy – which is easier to do using principles. In contrast, those who do not know what they are 
meant to be doing and even if they did, would not be inclined to do it (“the ill intentioned and ill 
informed”),  are  best  dealt  with  using  a  strategy  that  escalates  rapidly  up  the  enforcement 
pyramid.”146
This “responsive” approach, it is further argued, “is not contingent on any particular rule design and 
can operate in systems of i) highly detailed rules,  ii)  where the rules are mainly principles, iii) 
where there is a combination of both.”147
Having considered the forms, attributes and benefits of principles based regulation, the weaknesses 
inherent in this type of regulation are worth mentioning. Firstly, in relation to the all important aim 
of  ensuring  accountability  –  which  should  be  fostered  if  adequate  monitoring  procedures  are 
observed and carried out by the responsible levels of authority. Principles based regulation could 
serve as a hindrance towards ensuring accountability. In this respect, reference will be made to the 
seven paradoxes of principles based regulation – which are as follows:148
“(i)  The interpretative paradox :  Different  interpretations attributed to principles could result  in 
imprecise  and  general  terms  being  accorded  very  specific  interpretations  –  even  though 
principles are supposed to offer flexibility (where these are characterised by imprecise terms).
(ii) The communicative paradox: Principles, whilst facilitating communication, could also hinder 
such communication. The paradox is attributed to the distinction between legal use of language 
and its ordinary use. 
(iii) The compliance paradox: Principles provide scope for flexibility in compliance – however this 
could result in conservative and/or uniform behaviour by regulated firms.
(iv) The supervisory and enforcement paradox: Principles require enforcement to provide them with 
credibility – however over-enforcement could result in their demise.
(v) The internal management paradox: Principles based regulation has the potential to offer required 
flexibility for internal control systems to develop – and also the potential to overload them.
(vi) Ethical paradox
(vii) Trust paradox
A detailed consideration of the above mentioned paradoxes highlights the importance of having a 
clear understanding of the form of principles based regulation which is applicable to a particular 
bank or business. As highlighted under the substantive principles based regulation, “those who 
know what they are meant to be doing and are generally inclined to do it ( the well intentioned and 
well informed), are best dealt with using a negotiating strategy.” Hence a more draconian mode of 
enforcement , that is tougher sanctions, would not be best suited in facilitating compliance by such 
groups  –  such  sanctions  being  better  reserved  for  the  “ill  informed  and  ill  intentioned.” 
Furthermore, a tough punitive regime is one in which principles are unlikely to survive – even 
though detailed rules could still be implemented under principles based regulation.149
Hence the desired level of compliance required within a firm is best achieved having regard to the 
organisational structure which exists within an organisation – and to whether (as a result of a such 
determination), that organisation could be considered a suitable candidate for the application of 
principles  based  regulation.  Clear  delegation  and  segregation  of  duties  within  an  organisation 
would not only promote accountability, but would also facilitate a system where principles could be 
applied and also facilitate monitoring procedures. Consequently, monitoring would also facilitate 
accountability  –  since  frequent  reviews  and  discussions  between  management  and  appropriate 
personnel  should increase an understanding of  the activities  carried out  by particular  divisions 
within the organisation.
H. CONCLUSION
Monitoring fosters transparency, which in turn fosters accountability. Monitoring of key risks, as 
well as periodic evaluations by the business lines and internal audit constitute a vital element of 
corporate  governance  – hence  the  overall  effectiveness  of  a  bank’s  internal  controls  should  be 
monitored on an ongoing and frequent150 basis.151 
Since  it  is  possible  for  detailed  rules  to  operate  under  principles  based  regulation  – and since 
detailed  rules  constitute  a  vital  element  in  ensuring  that  clear  delegation  and  segregation  of 
responsibilities exist within an organisation, it could be said that the level of accountability derived 
under principles based regulation is dependent on the form of principles based regulation. Under the 
formal principles based regulation, the level of accountability derived is likely to be greater than 
that derived under full principles based regulation. As highlighted within the relevant sections of 
this paper, an approach which combines negotiating and punitive strategies is always considered 
best – owing to the level of flexibility offered by such an approach. However the organisational 
structure, culture and several other factors require consideration before substantive principles based 
regulation is judged to be the optimal approach.
In accordance with Principle 13 of the Principles for the Assessment of Internal Control Systems, 
“supervisors should require that all banks, regardless of size, have an effective system of internal 
controls that is consistent with the nature, complexity, and risk inherent in their on- and- off balance 
sheet activities and that corresponds to the bank’s environment and conditions.” Furthermore, “in 
those instances where supervisors determine that a bank’s internal control system is not adequate or 
effective for that bank’s specific risk profile, they should take appropriate action.”  In accordance 
with  Core  Principle  17  of  the  Basel  Core  Principles  for  Effective  Bank  Supervision,  Internal  
controls and audit, specific attention should given to ensure the existence of: (i)“clear arrangements 
for delegating authority and responsibility; (ii) separation of the functions that involve committing 
the bank, paying away its funds, and accounting for its assets and liabilities.”
Where  clear  delegation  of  authority,  segregation  of  responsibilities  are  not  in  place,  the  most 
appropriate and obvious action might be to initiate a more deterrence based approach – rather than a 
negotiative based approach. However, reference must be made to factors highlighted under the first 
paragraph of this conclusive section.
Increased formalisation under principles based regulation would still allow for a consideration of 
the  substance  of  transactions  – whilst  allowing for  flexibility  in  terms  of  its  application.  With 
regards to its application, this implies its suitability as the appropriate mode of regulation - based on 
the  level  of  accountability  it  could  provide  an  organization  with  and whether  an  organization, 
because of its structure and culture, should consider applying it at all.
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